


Converging Exposures, Divergent Experiences

Asian Americans, News and Information
Seeking, and the Circulation of Problematic
Narratives Online



Dr. Matthew Bui, University of Michigan
Cameron Moy, University of Pennsylvania
Jenny Liu, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC





Table of Contents

Executive Summary	04
Acknowledgements	06
Introduction	08
Survey Overview	10
Key Takeaways	16
Findings	
Theme 1: Language, Education, and Immigrant Generation Strongly Shape Reliance on Asian News Sources and News Media Diets.....	25
Theme 2: Convergent Experiences with Problematic Online Content, Divergent Levels of Concern.....	43
Theme 3: Divergent Experiences Combatting the Spread of Problematic Content, Similar Views of Institutional Roles and Responsibilities.....	55
Discussion	68
Appendices	
Appendix I: References.....	76
Appendix II: Summary Table of Findings.....	78
Appendix III: Sample Survey Questions.....	82
Appendix IV: Statistical Test Results.....	84

Executive Summary

This report summarizes how the digital media use and experiences of Asian Americans are shaped by various cultural, linguistic, and generational factors (e.g., age, ethnicity, education level, English-language proficiency, and political affiliation). It draws from a national survey of 2,000 participants from across the United States, including 1,750 Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders, to compare and contrast the experiences of these groups to those of the general U.S. population. We also provide policy and program recommendations as well as future research directions based on our findings.

Key Takeaways:

Takeaway #1: Asian Americans' media diets are distinct from those of the general U.S. population and are greatly shaped by identity (ethnicity and immigrant generation), language preference, and, at times, language proficiency. At the same time, there is a great desire among Asian Americans for more culturally-relevant news sources.

Takeaway #2: Experiences with, and exposure to, misinformation among Asian Americans were similar to those of the general U.S. population, with some exceptions. While all respondents reported moderate to high exposure to made-up news, higher rates of English-language proficiency correlated with higher exposure rates as well as higher confidence in recognizing made-up news.

Takeaway #3: Age, language, education, immigrant generation, and race/ethnicity (especially Asian American vs. NHPI), greatly shaped levels of concern as well as individual attitudes and behaviors. Those with more English-language proficiency tended to be more confident in addressing misinformation concerns, whereas those with more education were less confident, nonintuitively. Age also proved to be a significant factor in concern levels and attributing responsibility to various institutions.

Key Recommendations:

Recommendation #1: There is both a great need and opportunity for cultivating and resourcing Asian diasporic news sources (across all ethnicities) to provide Asian Americans with more culturally-relevant news and information. Additional research should further investigate the nature and format of such news and news sources, to better serve Asians and Asian Americans.

Recommendation #2: Digital literacy training programs and related community programs should continue developing and investing in in-language, and culturally and contextually aware, resources to mitigate the negative impacts of misinformation. Those with higher English-language proficiency likely have higher confidence in addressing misinformation because they have more resources and access to resources.

Recommendation #3: Future research should examine the impacts of digital literacy programs, especially to unpack how training programs increase or decrease confidence in identifying and concern levels with misinformation and other problematic content as well as provide digital skills.

Acknowledgements


We would like to thank research associates Emily Chi, David Mori, and Dominique Harrison for their formative help in survey design and previous stages of this study.

We also thank Advancing Justice | AAJC staff (Lia Nitake and Howard Shih) and partners from the previous focus group study — Asian and Pacific Islander American (APIA) Vote Michigan, Association of Chinese Americans (ACA), Chinese for Affirmative Action (CAA), NoMelonGroup, Asian Law Alliance, Montgomery County Progressive Asian American Network (MoCoPAAN), and Asian American Lead (AALead). Their contributions greatly shaped the survey design and data collection, without which this report would not have been possible.

Data design and layout provided by RITUAL STUDIO. ●



No Melon Group



Introduction

In 2021, Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC launched its misinformation project to better understand the Asian American-specific impacts of misleading news and information, largely made available through the emerging, and shifting, landscape of new media and digital technologies. In this work, Advancing Justice | AAJC often considers *problematic narratives* to refer to the specific category of misleading news and information under its purview (Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC, 2025). As the Algorithmic Transparency Institute (2020) explains, problematic online content “includes: mis- and disinformation, hate speech, conspiracies, and messages that **lack context** or **employ flaws in logic**... both **false** and **misleading** content as well as content that may not be factually incorrect, but **can have ill effects nonetheless.**” These narratives are problematic because they exploit existing divisions and distrust within communities, often reinforcing negative narratives, stereotypes, or tropes (Austin et al., 2021; Lee et al., 2023). Problematic online content can also deepen social rifts and disenfranchise entire groups, thus serving the interests of those who benefit from maintaining racial, economic, or political inequalities, among other negative harms and impacts on communities (Kuo & Marwick, 2021).

As Advancing Justice | AAJC built out this project and programmatic area, the team noticed a lack of in-depth quantitative research on how diverse members of the Asian American community receive their news and consume potentially problematic and/or misleading narratives. Surveying the landscape of existing resources, they saw a distinct gap in terms of cross-sectional research focusing on how unique individuals across generations, ethnic groups, and English-language abilities interact with misinformation. For example, due to the wide variety of topics it covered, the then recently released 2022 Asian American Voter Survey only captured a handful of questions about media and news consumption (Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC, 2022). Furthermore, as the sampling pool comprised eligible voters, there was a distinct skew towards Asian Americans with greater amounts of English-language proficiency.

To address this gap, Advancing Justice | AAJC partnered with Dr. Matthew Bui (University of Michigan) to conduct a series of focus groups and a multilingual survey of Asian Americans to discern the root causes of why certain Asian Americans are more vulnerable to believing

false stories and conspiracy theories than others. Given the nascent stage of research focused on Asian American misinformation, this study was directly informed by community members and tests assumptions tied to more anecdotal evidence and personal experiences.

Bui, Mori, and Liu (2025) [reported on the results of these focus groups](#), which drew from 101 voices across 12 focus groups to explore how factors such as language, age, and immigrant generation greatly shape digital media use and experiences, and general experiences and exposure to problematic content online. The authors, two of whom also led this current report, contended for the need for more than “just” language translation as a key intervention to misinformation, particularly within Asian American communities. Mainly, they called attention to the need to translate and consider how culture, context, and history often shapes digital media use and experiences of Asian Americans. This focus group study deeply informed the trends, patterns, and questions we sought to explore and answer through a national survey.

As such, this report summarizes how the digital media use and experiences of Asian Americans are shaped by various cultural, linguistic, and generational factors (e.g., age, ethnicity, education level, English-language proficiency, and political affiliation) (Nguyễn et al., 2023; Ozawa et al., 2024). It draws from a national survey of 2,000 participants from across the United States, including 1,750 Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders, to compare and contrast the experiences of these groups to those of the general U.S. population. We also provide policy and program recommendations as well as future research directions based on our findings. We hope the findings will be informative to contextualizing the organization’s and other organizations’ ongoing work related to the area as well as mapping out the Asian American misinformation landscape. In turn, this will help us develop more strategic, holistic, and community-centered interventions to be shared with community partners, civil rights organizations, technical experts and product teams, and policymakers. ●

Survey Overview

Drawing from the findings of our previous focus groups (Bui et al., 2025), we administered a national survey (n=2000) through the Qualtrics company and platform in Fall 2024. The survey employed sampling techniques to gather a range of experiences, targeting seven Asian American and Pacific Islander groups (i.e., Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Indian, Korean, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Vietnamese) alongside an eighth “General Population” group¹. This strategy sought to bolster the representation of Southeast (i.e., Filipino, Hmong, and Vietnamese) and South Asians (Indian), and Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders (NHPI), groups typically collapsed under the umbrella category of AAPIs yet with noticeably different—often disadvantaged—experiences, compared to those of groups such as East Asians (i.e., Chinese and Korean) (Allen et al., 2019; Lao, 2021; Teranishi, 2007). Upon recruitment, survey re-

sponses were gathered by Qualtrics via phone interviews and conducted in participants’ preferred languages, either English or one of the five translations offered: Chinese (Mandarin), Hindi, Korean, Tagalog, and Vietnamese.

Our research sought to understand nationwide patterns related to news and media consumption diets, experiences and encounters with misinformation, and perspectives on the future of news and media among AAPI communities and identities. Across these themes, ethnicity, English-language proficiency, immigration generation, and education level emerged as factors shaping experiences with news, media, and misinformation. Meanwhile, age and political affiliation did not appear as directly tied to Asian American and Pacific Islanders’ encounters with news, media, and misinformation. Below, we further unpack the survey findings and implications as well as limitations and future research directions. Of note, our respondents skewed younger and male. Although we do not specifically analyze or speculate on the effects of gender in this report, we highlight potential areas where these relationships might warrant future inquiry.

1. The General Population group refers to participants within the United States who were not restricted or purposively sampled based on specific subgroup targets. As such, the General Population numbers provide a baseline for observed phenomena.

Overview of Respondents

Following survey data collection administered by the survey research company Qualtrics, we garnered 2,000 survey responses, including responses from 1,750 individuals who identified as Asian American and/or Pacific Islander. Of note, 43 of these respondents identified as Japanese: they were recruited as part of our General Population group and were not within one of the seven target groups. The survey response breakdown by key demographic factors is summarized as follows:



Age: The survey results represent perspectives from a younger subset of the Asian American population, with Millennials (ages 29-44) making up a majority (55%) of the respondents, followed by Gen Z (ages 18-28) at 43%, and Gen X (ages 45-60) at 2% of the sample. As such, our report will largely compare Millennials to Gen Z and refrain from more sweeping claims about the impact of age across additional ages. That said, our previous focus groups skewed toward older generations (Gen X and Boomers, ages 45-80+), so the [discussion section](#) will highlight and identify future directions in light of observed age differences (and convergences) across the survey study and focus groups.



Education: Nearly all respondents had at least a high school diploma. Generally, respondents had high educational attainment: 32% of the sample reported an undergraduate degree, 25% reported a post-graduate degree, 19% reported some post-graduate education, 14% reported an associate degree, 9% reported some college education with no college degree, and 1% reported no high school degree attainment.³




Ethnicity: The survey purposely targeted six Asian ethnic groups alongside Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders, with 87% of respondents reporting an AAPI ethnicity. The targeted Asian ethnic groups were evenly distributed at 12-13% of the sample across Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Indian, and Hmong ethnicities while Native Hawaiian (5%) and Pacific Islander (6%) respondents collectively constituted an equivalent proportion of the sample. We also sampled a “General Population” group, the eighth survey group that constituted the remaining 13% of respondents, including Japanese (2%) and other ethnicities (White, Black, Latina/o/e). Relatedly, while Japanese participants reported similar levels of digital use, behaviors, and experiences to other Asian American participants, we do not largely report on their experiences, due to the small sample size and because they were not purposely sampled.



Immigration Generation: First generation immigrants made up a majority (55%) of the sample, while second (13%), third (13%), and latter (18%) generation Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders made up a smaller yet similar proportion of the sample.⁴

AaBbCc
DdEeFf


English Proficiency: Respondents typically self-described their English-language proficiency as advanced (47%) or native (40%), while “limited English proficient” speakers (beginner and intermediate) (14%) were also represented.²



Political Affiliation: A majority of the respondents self-identified as a Democrat (46%) or Republican (32%), while 21% of the sample identified as politically Independent.

The survey respondents encapsulate a wide range of experiences of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, especially across different ethnic groups, immigrant generation, political affiliation, and education. There are some notable skews: mainly, those surveyed were overwhelmingly younger than 45 years of age and tended to be more proficient in the English-language and formally educated. While we considered these factors when interpreting results, these demographics do, however, broadly correspond to the demographics of AAPIs within past research. Even with our sampling strategy targeting different ethnic groups, we were limited in our ability to include some groups that are historically “harder to count” (e.g., those whose primary language is not English and those with less formal education)⁵. Moreover, as noted previously, and in contrast to our survey respondents, our focus groups participants skewed toward older populations (Gen X and Boomers) and women: for this reason, we examine trends of age and gender across the focus groups and surveys within the [discussion section](#) rather than the survey results. ●

2. In this report, we use “limited English proficient” to refer to beginner and intermediate English speakers, a category akin to those who speak English less than “very well.” (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). As Guignard (2025) explains, “many Asian Americans are a part of the language minority community, a group of people who speak a language that is different from the dominant or majority language in the country” (see also US Census Bureau, 2020). Thus, not all Asian Americans are proficient in the English language, an important factor that impacts their experiences.
3. We did notice a high level of covariance of age and education in our population. We speculate this is because our less-educated participants were likely currently enrolled in college rather than non-college educated adults age 25 and older, an area for future exploration.
4. Per the [Harvard University Immigrant Initiative](#) and other community organizations drawing from a similar definition, we define a “first generation” immigrant as someone born outside of the United States. Second generation immigrants are born in the United States but have parents who are born abroad; third and latter generation immigrants are both born in the United States and have parents who were born in the U.S. At times, the 1.5 generation designation is used to refer to those who came to the U.S. as children, but we included these individuals within the first generation category for this survey’s analysis. See also Rumbaut (2004).
5. See also The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2018.



Key Takeaways



Key Takeaway 1


Asian Americans' media diets are distinct from those of the general U.S. population and are greatly shaped by identity (ethnicity and immigrant generation), language preference, and, at times, language proficiency. At the same time, there is a great desire among Asian Americans for more culturally-relevant news sources.

Recommendation: There is both a great need and opportunity for cultivating and resourcing Asian diasporic news sources (across all ethnicities) to provide Asian Americans with more culturally-relevant news and information. Additional research should further investigate the nature and format of such news and news sources, to better serve Asians and Asian Americans.

Key Takeaway 2

Experiences with, and exposure to, misinformation among Asian Americans were similar to those of the general U.S. population, with some exceptions. While all respondents reported moderate to high exposure to made-up news, higher rates of English-language proficiency correlated with higher exposure rates as well as higher confidence in recognizing made-up news.


Recommendation: Digital literacy training programs and related community programs should continue developing and investing in in-language, and culturally and contextually aware, resources to mitigate the negative impacts of misinformation. Those with higher English-language proficiency likely have higher confidence in addressing misinformation because they have more resources and access to resources.



Key Takeaway 3

Age, language, education, immigrant generation, and race/ethnicity (especially Asian American vs. NHPI), greatly shaped levels of concern as well as individual attitudes and behaviors. Those with more English-language proficiency tended to be more confident in addressing misinformation concerns, whereas those with more education were less confident, nonintuitively. Age also proved to be a significant factor in concern levels and attributing responsibility to various institutions.

Recommendation: Future research should examine the impacts of digital literacy programs, especially to unpack how training programs increase or decrease confidence in identifying and concern levels with misinformation and other problematic content as well as provide digital skills.



Findings

The following section captures the survey results by key themes in relation to the key demographics. While we generally describe trends in these sections, we also denote specific sets of results as “significant,” which means that statistical tests have determined a very meaningful relationship, beyond random chance (See [Appendix II](#) for the Summary Table of Results and [Appendix IV](#) for sample statistical test results).

At a high level, **Asian American respondents generally had distinct news media diets** from the General Population sample. For example, Asian American respondents tended to get their news headlines significantly more from Asian news sources and significantly less from U.S. news sources, television, and messaging apps, compared to the General Population. Further, Asian Americans consumed significantly more non-English news and significantly less English news than the General Population. **Asian Americans also followed international news significantly more closely, and national and local news significantly less closely**, compared to the General Population. Of note, the differences in national and local news following between Asian Americans and the General Population became very close for the younger groups. Meanwhile, Asian Americans reported similar usages of social media and radio as the General Population. Of note, **Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders tended to have more similar news diets to the General Population** compared to their Asian American counterparts, typically relying on English-only media diets and U.S.-based news sources.

In contrast, **Asian Americans’ experiences with problematic online content** and beliefs around the spread of problematic online content **did not significantly vary** from those of the General Population. Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders reported similar attitudes and experiences when asked about sharing fabricated news stories. Asian Americans reported encountering inaccurate and made-up news at similar frequencies as the General Population and were equally as likely to have shared made-up news stories. Asian Americans believed news media outlets should be significantly less responsible for preventing the spread of problematic online content compared to the General Population. However, they shared the General Population’s beliefs that government officials should be highly accountable and members of the public and technology companies moderately accountable for preventing the spread of problematic online content.

Theme 1: Language, Education, and Immigrant Generation Strongly Shape Reliance on Asian News Sources and News Media Diets

In this section, questions prompted respondents to reflect on the language of the news they regularly consume (English, non-English, or a mixture of both), where they typically receive their news headlines from (U.S. news sources, Asian news sources, television news, radio news, social media, and/or messaging), and finally, the region of news they most follow (international, national (U.S.), and/or local news). Below, we unpack news media diets by each demographic category: age, ethnicity, English proficiency, immigration status, political affiliation, and education. Of note, except for the race/ethnicity subsection, we only discuss the results for Asian American respondents as compared to the General Population.

Age

Gen Z (ages 18-28) Asian Americans were most likely to receive news headlines from social media (87%), U.S. news sources (82%), and television (48%). Millennial Asian Americans (ages 29-44) typically drew headlines from the same sources as Gen Z, although Millennials preferred U.S. news sources first (87%), followed by social media (77%) and television (64%). Gen X respondents (ages 45-60) most regularly consumed news headlines from U.S. news sources (79%), television (68%), and Asian news sources (61%).

Gen Z respondents tended to prefer English-language news sources and relied significantly less on non-English sources than Gen X respondents, with 50% of Gen Z respondents relying solely on English news sources and only 7% on non-English sources. Similar to Gen Z, Millennial respondents were significantly less likely to rely solely on non-English news sources than Gen X. Gen X relied more on non-English sources, with 18% of Gen X respondents exclusively following non-English sources.

Gen Z respondents followed all types of news (international, national, and local news) less closely than Gen X respondents (international: 4.74 vs. 5.00; national: 5.31 vs. 5.46; local: 5.25 vs. 5.61; on a scale from 1 (“not closely at all”) to 7 (“extremely closely”). Millennial respondents generally followed international (4.93), national (5.35), and local (5.28) news less than Gen X, although slightly more than Gen Z. Lastly, Gen X respondents most closely followed local news (5.61), straying from younger generations who most closely followed national news (Gen Z: 5.31; Millennials: 5.35), and followed all news more closely than did younger generations.

TABLE 1

Top 3 News Sources By Age

Age	Source 1	Source 2	Source 3
Gen Z (ages 18-28)	Social Media (87%)	U.S. News (82%)	Television (48%)
Millennials (ages 29-44)	U.S. News (87%)	Social Media (77%)	Television (64%)
Gen X (ages 45-60)	U.S. News (79%)	Television (68%)	Asian News (61%)

Ethnicity

The top three sources for headlines for most ethnicities were U.S. news sources, social media, and television, in that order. Filipino respondents deviated slightly from this trend, consuming the most headlines from social media, followed by U.S. news sources and then television. Korean, Vietnamese, and Hmong respondents, also breaking from this trend, indicated preferences for U.S. news sources, followed by social media and then Asian news sources. Nearly all ethnicities, with the exception of the Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders group, reported following Asian news sources significantly higher than the General Population group. This is likely an effect of a general U.S. population with fewer ties to international press and audiences as well as a lack of in-language news sources based in the United States (Rumbaut, 2004).

All Asian ethnicities consumed significantly less English-only news content and significantly more news that is both English and non-English, compared to the General Population group. Meanwhile, the news language diet for Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders most resembled the General Population group. Only Hmong respondents reported consuming significantly *more* non-English-only news than the General Population group. Roughly half of all Asian American ethnicities consumed a mix of English and non-English sources.

All Asian American ethnicities, except for the few Japanese respondents, reported closely following international news, with Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Indian, and Hmong respondents reporting significantly higher followings of international news than the General Population group. Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders followed international news significantly less than the General Population group. All respondents followed U.S. national news closely, with only Japanese respondents reporting following U.S. news significantly more closely than General Population respondents. Similarly, all respondents followed local news closely, but only Filipino, Vietnamese, and Hmong respondents reported significantly higher followings than the General Population group.

TABLE 2

Top 3 News Sources By Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Source 1	Source 2	Source 3
Chinese	U.S. News (86%)	Social Media (83%)	Television (55%)
Filipino	Social Media (86%)	U.S. News (84%)	Television (58%)
Korean	U.S. News (84%)	Social Media (80%)	Asian News (66%)
Vietnamese	U.S. News (85%)	Social Media (78%)	Asian News (62%)
Indian	U.S. News (89%)	Social Media (87%)	Television (53%)
Native Hawaiian	U.S. News (89%)	Television (72%)	Social Media (72%)
Pacific Islander	U.S. News (93%)	Social Media (79%)	Television (73%)
Hmong	U.S. News (93%)	Social Media (76%)	Asian News (72%)
General Population	U.S. News (95%)	Social Media (82%)	Television (68%)

TABLE 3

Table 3: I Follow ___ News Closely...

(Percentage, by Ethnicity, who answered “somewhat closely,” “closely,” and “extremely closely”)

Ethnicity	International News	National News	Local News
Chinese	62%	83%	75%
Filipino	64%	79%	81%
Korean	66%	79%	75%
Vietnamese	65%	79%	78%
Indian	60%	84%	74%
Native Hawaiian	37%	93%	81%
Pacific Islander	31%	88%	78%
Hmong	67%	81%	82%
General Population	40%	91%	84%

English Proficiency

With greater English proficiency, respondents drew headlines from Asian news sources *less* and from U.S. news sources *more*, signaling the importance of language proficiency in type of news consumption. Over 75% of limited proficient English speakers relied on Asian news sources for headlines. Similarly, over 50% of advanced and native English speakers followed U.S. news sources for headlines. As witnessed in other demographics, social media was highly used for news consumption, with at least 76% of respondents across all English-language proficiencies relying on social media for news headlines.

Respondents' English proficiency was potentially the most deterministic of the language of a respondents' news media diet. As one might expect, reliance on English-only news sources increased fairly linearly: survey results suggested that limited English proficient speakers very rarely relied solely on English-only news, while a large majority of native English speakers reported solely consuming English-only news (64%).

Likewise, non-English-only news consumption decreased with increased English proficiency, although this was not linear. 28% of limited English proficient speakers consumed non-English-only news sources. This number fell to 4% for advanced English speakers and 2% for native English speakers. Limited


English proficient speakers and advanced English speakers were more likely to draw news from a mix of English and non-English sources, with 54% and 55% of respondents reporting multilingual news access, respectively.

Following previous patterns, with greater English proficiency, respondents followed national (U.S.) and local news *more* and followed international news *less*. Limited English proficient speakers only occasionally followed local and national news, with scores of 4.80 and 4.94, respectively, on a scale of 1 ("not closely at all") to 7 ("extremely closely") representing how close each type of news was followed. Native speakers scored about 5.5 out of 7 on both metrics. Conversely, native speakers followed international news significantly less (scores around 4.5 out of 7) than limited English proficient speakers (5.3 out of 7). The results suggest that limited English proficient speakers might add local and national news to their media consumption while maintaining their international news consumption (Nielsen, 2023), whereas advanced and native English speakers are curtailing their international news consumption, replacing it with more national and local news consumption (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

Region of News Consumption by English Proficiency

● International ● National (U.S.) ● Local



Available responses ranged from 1 to 7

Education

Respondents across all education levels received a majority of their news from U.S. news sources, followed by social media and television. Among most education levels, Asian news sources were fairly popular, with around half of respondents regularly receiving news headlines from Asian news sources. However, those without college degrees (some college, no college degree, and an associates degree) did report receiving news from social media the most: this might be due to a skew in our sample toward educated, yet younger participants. Thus, more data should be collected among non-college-educated individuals over 25 years old to determine the validity of this specific result.

Consumption of English-only news sources decreased as education level increased. Similarly, consuming a mix of both English and non-English news sources generally increased with education level, with a majority of post grads having a blended news media diet. Again, consumption of non-English-only news sources was generally low, with no respondents with a high school diploma indicating they followed non-English-only news, although this specific finding might be the result of some covariance with age.

All respondents followed national news most closely, followed by local and international news. Those with some high school but no degree reported following national news extremely closely. Admittedly, those with some or no high school education constituted only 1% of the survey population so additional research is necessary.

Immigration Generation


Again, we see news consumption dominated by U.S. news, social media, and television across immigration generations. Broadly, Asian news consumption decreased with latter generations: that is, first generation immigrants' news diets were the most starkly different from third and latter generation immigrants. For one, first generation respondents followed U.S. news and social media in equal amounts, followed by Asian news sources and then television. Second generation respondents followed social media most closely followed by U.S. news sources and television. Third generation respondents followed U.S. news most closely, then television and social media. Lastly, latter generations most closely followed U.S. news, then social media and television. Generally, while all groups tended to report U.S. news and social media sources as their top news sources, first generation immigrants also reported closely following Asian news sources.

When asked about news language, first (9%), second (4%), and third generation (4%) immigrants reported significantly higher rates of non-English-only news consumption than latter generations (0%). Put another way, the longer the respondent's family had resided in the U.S., the more English-only news they consumed and less non-English news they consumed.

All immigrant generations followed national (U.S.) news most closely, with scores of about 5.5 on a scale of 1 ("not closely at all") to 7 ("extremely closely"). All generations closely followed national and local news, with scores of at least 5 out of 7. However, only first generation respondents followed international news closely (scoring 5.4 out of 7), while second to latter generations only *moderately* followed international news (scoring between 4 and 4.5 out of 7).

TABLE 4

News Source Preferences by Immigrant Generation



Political Affiliation

A majority of respondents received their news headlines from U.S. news sources, social media, and television, across political affiliation. Partisans (both Democrat- and Republican-leaning respondents) consumed news media from Asian news sources and radio at rates significantly higher than Independents. Further, Independents consumed their headlines most from social media, whereas partisans (both Democrats and Republicans) preferred U.S. news sources. This potentially confirms previous focus group accounts that major U.S. news outlets were perceived to be politically partisan and biased, thus fueling the rise of “independent” Asian and Asian American creators on social media to fill this gap of culturally-relevant yet “unbiased” news (Bui et al., 2025).

Respondents tended to have similar language news media diets across political affiliations. Partisans relied significantly less on English-only sources (43%) and significantly more on a mix of English and non-English sources (48% for Republicans; 52% for Democrats) than Independents (54% and 40%, respectively).

All groups reported moderate to high international, national, and local news consumption, with scores between 4.5 and 5.5 on a scale from 1 (“not closely at all”) to 7 (“extremely closely”) across all categories. Partisans followed international news significantly more than Independents, with Republicans following international news the most closely out of all three groups. The opposite is true for national and local news: Democrats followed national and local news more closely than Republicans, and Independents followed both national and local news more than partisans. All political affiliations followed national news the most, followed by local news. ●

Theme 2: Convergent Experiences with Problematic Online Content, Divergent Levels of Concern

In this next section, respondents were asked to report on their experiences with inaccurate news, made-up news, and/or misinformation, (what we refer to as problematic content within this report and our previous focus group report). We asked about: how frequently respondents encountered news that was not fully accurate or completely made-up, respondents’ ability to recognize made-up news, and respondents’ belief that made-up news causes confusion.

Age

Respondents across all age generations tended to have similar experiences with misinformation and false news. Respondents across all age groups reported “hardly ever” encountering news that was not fully accurate, averaging a score of 2.31 out of 4 where 2 represented “hardly ever” and 3 represented “sometimes.” This average increased to 2.61 when respondents were asked how frequently they encountered news that was completely made-up. All respondents reported being generally confident in their abilities to identify made-up news, averaging a score of 3.14 out of 4, with 3 representing “somewhat confident.” Gen Z and Millennial respondents, however, were significantly more likely to believe that made-up news causes confusion, scoring an average 2.96 out of 4, compared to Gen X’s score of 2.50, where 3 represented “some confusion.”

These trends hint at greater concern about made-up news among younger (Gen Z and Millennial) rather than older age groups (Gen X): mainly, while all generations are encountering problematic content online in seemingly equal doses, younger generations are more concerned about the implications and impacts of made-up news. These results confirm past focus group accounts where participants shared about the perceived risk misinformation posed for their elders (i.e., parents and grandparents). Of note, the research team speculates that more people are likely encountering misleading news but not identifying it as such, which is a huge part of the problem of misinformation. In addition, considering this survey took place in late 2024, we wonder how the rise in AI-generated content, including deepfakes, might impact individuals’ interactions with news that is “completely made-up” as opposed to “not fully accurate...”

Ethnicity

Encounters with misinformation were generally consistent across ethnicities. When asked about frequency of encountering news that was not fully accurate or that was completely made-up, responses ranged from 1.91 to 2.50 and 2.34 to 2.77 on a scale from 1 ("never") to 4 ("often"), respectively. Pacific Islanders reported scores at the lower end of these ranges, while Hmongs reported higher end values for both questions. While these results indicate respondents across all Asian ethnicities “hardly ever” encountered “completely made-up” news, the research team suggests further investigation is warranted, as this contrasts starkly with past studies. Again, we wonder and speculate whether newer forms of misinformation such as AI-generated content and deepfakes might shift what constitutes “completely” vis-a-vis “partly” fake news (Liu, 2025).

Of note, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Indian, and Hmong respondents reported slightly fewer encounters with inaccurate news than the General Population group, whereas Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders reported more encounters than the General Population. Regarding completely made-up news, only Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Hmong respondents reported lower scores than the General Population group, with Filipinos and Pacific Islanders, groups with typically higher rates of English proficiency, reporting more encounters.

Similarly, respondents’ self-reported ability to recognize made-up news and belief made-up news generally causes confusion was tightly clustered around 3, meaning most respondents were generally confident in their recognition of made-up news and believed made-up news causes confusion. Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, and Hmong respondents reported significantly higher abilities to recognize made-up news than the General Population. Only Chinese and Indian respondents reported significantly higher beliefs than the General Population that made-up news causes confusion.

English Proficiency



Respondents across all English proficiencies tended to have similar experiences with made-up news and attitudes. All groups reported moderate encounters with completely made-up news, scoring an average of 2.57 on a scale from 1 ("never") to 4 ("often"). All respondents were somewhat confident in their abilities to identify made-up news, with scores clustered around 3. Lastly, all respondents believed made-up news generally causes confusion, with scores clustered around 3.

However, confidence in identifying problematic content online increased with English proficiency, as native speakers reported scores significantly higher than other English proficiency groups. Importantly, English-language proficiency results in greater access to resources, especially lateral reading and fact-checking resources, key interventions for curbing the negative impacts of misinformation.⁶ Reported encounters with news that is “not fully” accurate also increased with English proficiency: for instance, limited English proficient speakers scored 1.94—indicating they only sometimes encountered inaccurate news stories—whereas native English speakers scored 2.49—indicating they encountered inaccurate news stories in limited but noticeable amounts on scales from 1 ("never") to 4 ("often").

6. For example, see Asian American Disinformation Table (2022) and Wineburg & McGrew. (2017).

FIGURE 2

Encounters with Misinformation by English Proficiency



Available responses ranged from 1 to 4

FIGURE 3

Resistance Against Falsified News by English Proficiency

● Limited English Proficient ● Advanced ● Native



Available responses ranged from 1 to 4
*Note: "Limited English Proficient" and "Advanced" on line 2 are the same value

Education


Education level was one of the most influential categories in understanding respondents' encounters with misinformation. Nearly all respondent groups reported moderate encounters with falsified and made-up news stories. However, those with less than a high school education reported much more encounters with falsified news and made-up news. Meanwhile, respondents whose highest educational achievement was a high school degree also reported lower encounters with falsified and made-up news, but this result was not as dramatic. Again, due to skews towards more educated respondents within our sample, we suggest additional research should be conducted, especially targeting those with some or no high school education.

Similarly, respondents across education levels were fairly confident in their abilities to recognize made-up news, with those with some high school or at most a high school degree reporting much higher confidence in their abilities to recognize made-up news compared to their more educated counterparts. When asked about beliefs around made-up news causing confusion, again, respondents with some high school near unilaterally answered that made-up news "causes a great deal of confusion." Respondents with some college and no degree and those with an associate degree reported the lowest beliefs that made-up news causes public confusion. We found these findings to be a bit coun-

terintuitive, but we speculate that confidence in identifying problematic online content and one's perceived ability do not necessarily map to actual ability, and we also wonder if age and education—and exposure to media literacy trainings within K-12 education—heightens an awareness of and concern about problematic online content, an important question for future inquiries. We also note the need to further test and understand the covariance of age and education in our results, and reiterate the potentially important next step of gathering more data among non-college-educated individuals over 25 years of age.

FIGURE 4.1


Encounters with Misinformation by Education



Available responses ranged from 1 to 4

FIGURE 4.2

Resistance Against Falsified News by Education



Available responses ranged from 1 to 4

Immigration Generation

Similar to the trends by ethnicity, immigrant generation did not prove to be a distinguishing factor for encounters with misinformation. The main point of deviation came when respondents were asked about their encounters with news that was partially inaccurate. All generations (except second generation immigrants) witnessed inaccurate news in moderate dosages, while second generation immigrants reported "hardly ever" encountering partially inaccurate news. All generations reported experiencing completely made-up news stories in moderate dosages, but latter generations reported significantly higher scores than those of the first three generations.

All generations were fairly confident in their abilities to recognize made-up news, with no significant deviance across immigration generations. This result carried over to beliefs that made-up news causes public confusion. All respondents generally believed that made-up news causes confusion, but first and second generation respondents reported significantly lower rates of such beliefs than latter generation respondents.

Political Affiliation

Respondents across all political affiliations generally shared similar experiences when asked about how they encounter misinformation. All respondents felt they encountered news that was not fully accurate and news that was completely made-up only "sometimes" to "hardly ever." All respondents felt fairly confident with their abilities to recognize made-up news. While all respondents agreed that made-up news causes confusion, Independents indicated it causes significantly less confusion than did partisans. Moreover, Republicans felt they encountered news that was not fully accurate at a significantly lower rate than Democrats and Independents. ●

Theme 3: Divergent Experiences Combatting the Spread of Problematic Content, Similar Views of Institutional Roles and Responsibilities

In this last section, respondents were asked about the role of individuals and institutions in spreading and combating misinformation. Specifically, we asked respondents to reflect on when they shared political stories they later determined to be fabricated and political stories they knew were made-up when sharing. Respondents also were prompted to share their views on the responsibility of members of the public, government officials, technology companies, and news media in combating inaccurate news information.

Age

When asking about encounters with misinformation, respondents personally shared fabricated and made-up news stories in similar proportions. 37% of Gen Z and 37% of Gen X respondents reported sharing a news story they later found out was fabricated, while only 32% of Millennials reported doing the same. Notably, 29% of Gen X respondents indicated sharing a political story knowing it was completely made-up, while these percentages dropped to 23% and 19% for Gen Z and Millennials, respectively, again gesturing to the importance of age for future inquiry. In future work, especially interviews and focus groups, we suggest exploring potential motivations for sharing such stories, even when aware a story was made-up.

Similarly, respondents typically had similar views around the role of institutions in combating misinformation and other types of problematic online content. Gen Z and Millennials scored nearly identically, ranking government officials as most responsible, followed by news media, technology companies, and finally members of the public. Gen X scored similarly for technology companies and government officials, but believed members of the public and news media should be accountable for inaccurate information significantly more than Gen Z respondents.

FIGURE 5

Active Spreading of Misinformation by Generation

● Gen Z (18-28) ● Millennial (29-44) ● Gen X (>45)





FIGURE 6

Responsibility of Combatting Inaccurate Information by Generation

- Members of the public
- Government officials
- Technology companies
- News media



Available responses ranged from 1 to 7

Ethnicity

Across ethnic lines, respondents varied in their experiences with sharing fabricated political stories. Pacific Islander (43%), Filipino (39%), and Indian (38%) respondents shared a political story they later identified as fabricated in greater proportions than the General Population group. Chinese (29%), Korean (30%), Native Hawaiian (30%), Hmong (31%), and Vietnamese (32%) respondents reported being less likely than the General Population group to share a political story they later identified as fabricated.

These numbers dramatically shifted when respondents were asked if they had shared a political story they knew was made-up at the time of sharing. Nearly all AAPI ethnicities reported equal or higher proportions of sharing fabricated news compared to the General Population group (18%): Hmong (32%) respondents were most likely to knowingly share made-up news stories, followed by Pacific Islander (29%), Native Hawaiian (22%), Filipino (22%), Indian (19%), Vietnamese (18%), and Korean (18%) respondents. Chinese respondents were the least likely to have shared a news story they knew was made-up at the time (14%).

Respondents of all ethnicities agreed that government officials, followed by news media outlets, should be most accountable for combatting inaccurate information. Most ethnicities believed that technology companies and then members of the public should be less but still accountable for combatting inaccurate information. Native Hawaiian respondents thought members of the public should be more responsible than technology companies.

English Proficiency

Limited English proficient speakers were most likely to share a political story they later found out was false (42%) and share a political story they knew was made-up at the time (28%). About one-third of native English speakers (31%) shared a political story they later identified as false, with this number rising to 33% for advanced English speakers. Relatedly, 28% of limited English proficient speakers shared a political story knowing it was made-up, while about 20% of advanced and native speakers reported doing so.

When asked about the role of institutions in combating inaccurate information, most respondents agreed in this order of accountability, from greatest to least: government officials, news media, technology companies, followed by members of the public. Interestingly, responsibility placed on members of the public increased with English proficiency. Advanced and native English speakers also reported placing higher responsibility on technology companies than limited English proficient speakers. Advanced and native speakers indicated a belief in greater responsibility on the part of news media in combatting inaccurate information than limited English proficient speakers.

FIGURE 7

Responsibility of Combatting Inaccurate Information by English Proficiency

- Members of the public
- Government officials
- Technology companies
- News media



Available responses ranged from 1 to 7

Education

Prior trends held, except for respondents with some high school education. 0% of those with some high school education reported having shared a political story they later identified as fabricated, but this was not significant, likely due to small sample size. In comparison, about 30-40% of the remaining respondents (i.e. those with at least a high school diploma) reported the same. When asked about sharing political stories respondents knew were made-up at the time of sharing, these trends continued to persist. 0% of respondents with some high school education and 8% with a high school degree reported sharing a political story knowing it was fabricated. This percentage jumped to about 20-25% of respondents with at least some college education.

Similarly, nearly all respondents agreed that government officials, followed by news media outlets should be most accountable for combating inaccurate information. Respondents with some high school education believed that government officials should be held extremely accountable, and high school grads believed news media outlets should be most accountable. With higher levels of education, belief in the relative responsibility of technology companies generally increased, while belief in the responsibility of members of the public generally decreased. Those with at least a college degree found technology companies more responsible than members of the public, while those without bachelor's degrees indicated the opposite.

Immigration Generation

Respondents shared misleading information in similar proportions across immigration generations. Between 31% and 34% of all respondents reported sharing a political story they later identified as fabricated, with third generation immigrants being least likely to share a fabricated story and first and second generation respondents being most likely to do the same. Interestingly, third generation respondents (24%) were most likely to have shared a falsified news story they knew was fabricated at the time, with second generation immigrants being the least likely to do the same (18%). Again, there was little variation in proportions of respondents who had shared a political story knowing it was made-up.

All respondents agreed that government officials and news media outlets should be most accountable for limiting the spread of inaccurate information. Further, both second generation and latter generation respondents thought members of the public should be more responsible (although still only somewhat responsible) for combating inaccurate information than technology companies, breaking from previous trends (See Figure 8).

Political Affiliation


Generally, all respondents had similar experiences when asked about their personal roles in spreading misinformation. 35% of Republicans and Independents reported sharing a political story they later identified as fabricated. This number dropped to 32% for Democrats, but the result was not significant. Similarly, 23% of Independents reported sharing a political story knowing it was made-up, while only 22% and 20% of Republicans and Democrats, respectively, shared the same. Again, this result was not significant.

Democrat and Republican respondents agreed in the order of responsibility different institutions maintain in combating inaccurate information: government officials, news media, technology companies, and lastly members of the public. Similarly, they agreed that government officials and news media outlets should be highly responsible for preventing the spread of misinformation, while technology companies and members of the public should be moderately responsible. Independents viewed technology companies as significantly less accountable than partisans. ●

FIGURE 8

Responsibility of Combatting Inaccurate Information by Immigrant Generation

- Members of the public
- Government officials
- Technology companies
- News media



Available responses ranged from 1 to 7

Discussion

Based on 12 focus groups with more than 100 participants across ages, ethnicities, and regions within the United States, our last report identified the need to move “beyond” translational interventions for AAPIs in order to contravene the negative impacts of problematic online content (Bui et al., 2025). Many well-intentioned interventions and programs designed to combat misinformation and related problematic online content highlight language translation as a key strategy but neglect other necessary translations, such as “translating” cultural nuances. The findings from our recent survey confirm this need to consider language as an important factor that strongly modulates AAPI experiences of digital media, often in ways that shape the news and media diets of these individuals to be distinct from that of the General Population. However, we also confirm and uplift key patterns and trends that illustrate the complexity of the Asian American and Native Hawaiian landscape of digital media experiences. That is, beyond language (and language translation as an intervention strategy), our survey findings illuminate the influential role of education and immigrant generation on AAPI digital media experiences, and particularly in how individuals assess problematic online content and consider various strategies for mitigation. At times, age and ethnicity played important roles in shifting trends, but we contend these relationships need to be investigated in future work (alongside the impacts of gender). Moreover, there were significant contrasting experiences between Asian Americans vs. Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders, providing evidence for their diverging experiences. We present a summary of these findings alongside recommendations for three general areas of potentially highly impactful intervention, on both a community programs and policy level.

Misinformation refers to all inaccurate and/or false information, regardless of intent, while disinformation refers to distinct, deliberate attempts to spread false information. In this way, disinformation is actually a form of misinformation, and for the purposes of this report, we will include the term “disinformation” under the umbrella term “misinformation.”

Takeaway #1: Asian Americans’ media diets are distinct from those of the general U.S. population and are greatly shaped by identity (ethnicity and immigrant generation), language preference, and, at times, language proficiency. At the same time, there is a great desire among Asian Americans for more culturally-relevant news sources.

Recommendation #1: There is both a great need and opportunity for cultivating and resourcing Asian diasporic news sources (across all ethnicities) to provide Asian Americans with more culturally-relevant news and information. Additional research should further investigate the nature and format of such news and news sources, to better serve Asians and Asian Americans.

First, our findings from Theme 1 show how Asian American media diets are distinct from those of the General Population: across all Asian groups, while participants did engage with U.S. and local news, they also typically reported higher rates of engagement with Asian news sources and had media diets mostly consisting of “mixed” sources, across both English- and non-English sources (Appendix II). Meanwhile, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders did not follow Asian news sources as closely, and they also tended to have English-only news diets, at rates mostly comparable to those of the General Population. While Asian American participants followed local and national news at rates similar to that of the General Population, they weighed international news as of greater importance. Finally, social media seems to be a more major source for news headlines with younger participants.

The survey findings corroborate recent and past work calling attention to AAPI groups’ translational ties and how the identities of these individuals might result in ties to Asian news sources and Asian language news, especially as a means of staying in touch with this identity: put plainly, language and immigrant generation significantly shape media diets (Asian American Disinformation Table, 2022; Lane et al., 2025; Liu, 2025). For example, the longer the respondent's family had resided in the U.S., the more English-only news they consumed and less non-English news they consumed (Nielsen, 2023). These findings also allude to the influential role of age and education and how political affiliation did not majorly impact news seeking; they also generally illuminate how NHPI experiences are at times contrasting to those of the Asian diaspora, warranting deeper inquiry into how NHPI groups can be served by future interventions and the potential limits of targeting “AAPIs” as an umbrella group. ●

Takeaway #2: Experiences with, and exposure to, misinformation among Asian Americans were similar to the general U.S. population, with some exceptions. While all reported exposure, and moderate to high exposure to made-up news, higher rates of English-language proficiency correlated with higher exposure rates, and higher confidence in recognizing made-up news.

Recommendation #2: Digital literacy training programs and related community programs should continue developing and investing in in-language, and culturally and contextually aware, resources to mitigate the negative impacts of misinformation. Those with higher English-language proficiency likely have higher confidence in addressing misinformation because they have more resources and access to resources.

Takeaway #3: Age, language, education, immigrant generation, and race/ethnicity (especially Asian American vs. NHPI), greatly shaped levels of concern as well as individual attitudes and behaviors. Those with more English-language proficiency tended to be more confident in addressing misinformation concerns, whereas those with more education were less confident, nonintuitively. Age also proved to be a significant factor in concern levels and attributing responsibility to various institutions.

Recommendation #3: Future research should examine the impacts of digital literacy programs, especially to unpack how training programs increase or decrease confidence in identifying and concern levels with misinformation and other problematic content as well as provide digital skills.

In terms of experiences with problematic online content (Theme 2), the majority of our results mostly signal that self-reported exposure to misinformation and related problematic content online was relatively similar across groups and in comparison to General Population rates. Generally, ethnicity, education, English-language ability, and immigrant generation do not seem to significantly alter rates of exposure to problematic online content. However, some slight yet notable differences in confidence and concern levels emerged in terms of age, language, and education differences. For example, Millennials and Gen X seemed to be more concerned about problem-

atic online content, whereas Gen Z reported less concern. Compared to older participants (Gen X), younger participants (Millennials and Gen Z) were also comparatively more concerned about misinformation generally. In addition, political affiliation emerged as a potentially influential factor: while all respondents agreed that made-up news is confusing, Independents found it significantly less confusing than partisan participants (Democrats and Republicans) (Chan et al., 2022).

While all respondents reported moderate to high exposure to made-up news, higher English-language proficiency correlated with higher exposure rates and higher confidence in recognizing made-up news (Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC, 2024; Austin et al., 2021). Importantly, education seemed to be a key factor in confidence levels relating to assessing and addressing problematic online content: those with high school as their highest level of educational attainment reported the greatest confidence in recognizing made-up news, which is a somewhat nonintuitive finding. However, we hypothesize higher education might result in a deeper sensitivity to the potential negative impacts of problematic online content and propose future inquiry into this relationship and finding, especially considering this finding alongside the previous finding showing how higher English-language proficiency increased confidence. Once again, NHPI experiences significantly diverged from those of Asian American groups, as NHPI respondents reported significantly lower scores for exposure to problematic content, again calling attention to contrasting experiences between these two groups.

When it comes to behaviors and responses to problematic online content (Theme 3), we did see some important patterns and trends, again alluding to the importance of age and English-language ability. For example, most groups (except Chinese individuals) reported knowingly sharing inaccurate stories at rates similar or greater than the General Population rate. In terms of intra-community differences within AAPI groups, age emerged as a key factor: that is, all age groups agreed government and media institutions held a majority of responsibility for contravening the negative impacts of problematic online content, yet Gen X also felt the public held equal responsibility. Limited English proficient speakers (28%) reported sharing fabricated stories more, compared to advanced-to-native speakers (20%). Interestingly, English-language proficiency is highly correlated with placing more responsibility on the general public and, to some extent, tech companies. Again, we also see how education influences trends in a noticeably nonintuitive way, as those with only high school education reported lower rates of sharing fabricated content. With greater education, more responsibility was placed on technology companies and less on the general public. Political affiliation seemed to have little impact except that Independents viewed technology companies as significantly less accountable than partisans. ●

Limits and Future Directions

Admittedly, there are still areas of future inquiry and exploration that might further enrich recommendations and interventions. First, an in-depth look into these diverse media diets could be beneficial: for instance, mapping and analyzing the expansive network of Asian language sources, building on the work of projects such as the AAPI Media Map and Directory (“AAPI Media Map & Directory,” n.d.). In this vein of work, we recommend looking at gaps of community needs not being addressed and focusing on specific geographic areas, especially since local news was cited as an important resource within our focus groups. While our survey findings did indicate less following of local news by Asian American survey participants, this could potentially point to a dearth of available local news sources rather than lack of interest from Asian Americans. Based on our survey findings and skews alongside observed trends, we also propose further inquiry into age (how youth and/or seniors might contrast to the findings we have); and interrogating the NHPI experience, especially in how it might converge or diverge with Asian diasporic experiences. Due to the high covariance of age and education in our population, we also specifically note the need to collect more data from non-college educated adults age 25 and older. Finally, within the focus groups and survey findings, AI has been a novel area of technological innovation: Advancing Justice - AAJC has engaged in [AI listening sessions](#), and we propose future inquiry into Asian American experiences with this emerging technology. ●

Appendices

Appendix I: References

- AAPI Media Map & Directory. (n.d.). *Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism*. Retrieved February 5, 2026, from <https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/centers/center-community-media/asian-media-initiative/aapi-media-map-directory/>
- Algorithmic Transparency Institute. (2020). *Ethnic Media Fellowship*. <https://ati.io/ethnic-media-fellowship/>
- Allen, W., Jones, C., & McLewis, C. (2019). The Problematic Nature of Racial and Ethnic Categories in Higher Education [American Council on Education]. *Race and Ethnicity in Higher Education*. <https://www.equityinhighered.org/resources/ideas-and-insights/the-problematic-nature-of-racial-and-ethnic-categories-in-higher-education/>
- Asian American Disinformation Table. (2022). *Power, Platforms, and Politics: Asian Americans & Disinformation*. <https://www.asianamdisinfo.org/resources/asian-american-disinformation-landscape-report-2022/>
- Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. (2022, July 25). *2022 Asian American Voter Survey*. Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. <https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/publication/2022-asian-american-voter-survey>
- Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. (2024). *Digital Literacy in the Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander Communities*.
- Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. (2025, April 18). *Asian Americans Advancing Justice – AAJC Releases Unprecedented Report Detailing Digital Media Use Among Asian Americans*. Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. <https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/press-release/asian-americans-advancing-justice-aajc-releases-unprecedented-report-detailing>
- Austin, E. W., Borah, P., & Domgaard, S. (2021). COVID-19 disinformation and political engagement among communities of color: The role of media literacy. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*. <https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-58>
- Bui, M., Mori, D., & Liu, J. (2025, April 18). *Beyond Language Translation*. Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC. <https://www.advancingjustice-aajc.org/publication/beyond-language-translation>
- Chan, N. K. M., Kim, J. Y., & Leung, V. (2022). COVID-19 and Asian Americans: How Elite Messaging and Social Exclusion Shape Partisan Attitudes. *Perspectives on Politics*, 20(2), 618–634. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592721003091>
- Guignard, Z. (2025, August 28). New Census Data on Language Lift Up the Importance of Language Access for Asian Americans. *Medium*. <https://aajc.medium.com/new-census-data-on-language-lift-up-the-importance-of-language-access-for-asian-americans-5ed1364089d5>
- Kuo, R., & Marwick, A. (2021). *Critical disinformation studies: History, power, and politics*. <https://doi.org/10.17615/2E3Z-M450>
- Lane, D. S., Chen, M., & Wang, Y. (2025). An “Identity Turn” in political communication?: Testing the relationship between media use and identity alignment in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, jqaf026. <https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaf026>
- Lao, M. (2021). *The Case for Requiring Disaggregation of Asian American and Pacific Islander Data*. *California Law Review*. <https://www.californialawreview.org/online/the-case-for-requiring-disaggregation-of-asian-american-and-pacific-islander-data>
- Lee, A. Y., Moore, R. C., & Hancock, J. T. (2023). Designing misinformation interventions for all: Perspectives from AAPI, Black, Latino, and Native American community leaders on misinformation educational efforts. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*. <https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-111>
- Liu, J. (2025, May 21). *How are Asian Americans affected by online misinformation?* Mashable. <https://mashable.com/article/asian-americans-online-misinformation>
- Nguyễn, S., Moran, R. E., Nguyen, T.-A., & Bui, L. (2023). “We Never Really Talked About politics”: Race and Ethnicity as Foundational Forces Structuring Information Disorder Within the Vietnamese Diaspora. *Political Communication*, 40(4), 415–439. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2023.2201940>
- Nielsen. (2023). *Asian Language Media Consumption and Preferences: Study of Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese Audiences*.
- Ozawa, J. V. S., Woolley, S., & Lukito, J. (2024). Taking the power back: How diaspora community organizations are fighting misinformation spread on encrypted messaging apps. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*. <https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-146>
- Rumbaut, R. G. (2004). Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States. *International Migration Review*, 38(3), 1160–1205. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00232.x>
- Teranishi, R. T. (2007). Race, ethnicity, and higher education policy: The use of critical quantitative research. *New Directions for Institutional Research*, 2007(133), 37–49. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ir.203>
- U.S. Census Bureau. (2020). *People That Speak English Less Than “Very Well” in the United States*. Census.Gov. <https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/people-that-speak-english-less-than-very-well.html>
- Wineburg, Sam & McGrew, Sarah (2017). Lateral reading: Reading less and learning more when evaluating digital information. Stanford History Education Group Working Paper No. 2017-A1 . Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048994> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3048994>

Appendix II

Summary of Findings

		I get my news headlines from...												The news I consume is...						I closely follow...					
		U.S. News		Asian News		Television		Radio		Social Media		Messaging		English only		Non-English only		A mix of both		International news		National (U.S.) news		Local News	
Demographic		AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP
Age	Gen Z	82%	96%	46%	1%	48%	68%	7%	9%	87%	87%	9%	8%	50%	95%	7%	0%	43%	5%	4.74	4.36	5.31	5.44	5.25	5.48
	Millennial	87%	95%	54%	4%	64%	69%	12%	12%	77%	78%	8%	14%	42%	98%	6%	0%	52%	2%	4.93	4.22	5.35	5.67	5.28	5.44
	Gen X	79%	83%	61%	0%	68%	67%	18%	0%	43%	83%	14%	67%	39%	100%	18%	0%	43%	0%	5	5.5	5.46	6.33	5.61	6.33
Ethnicity	Chinese	86%	95%	52%	3%	55%	68%	10%	11%	83%	82%	6%	13%	39%	97%	7%	0%	53%	3%	4.88	4.31	5.29	5.6	5.25	5.25
	Filipino	84%	95%	49%	3%	58%	68%	9%	11%	86%	82%	8%	13%	47%	97%	6%	0%	47%	3%	5.04	4.31	5.31	5.6	5.31	5.25
	Korean	84%	95%	66%	3%	49%	68%	10%	11%	80%	82%	6%	13%	34%	97%	11%	0%	55%	3%	4.99	4.31	5.24	5.6	5.18	5.25
	Vietnamese	85%	95%	62%	3%	56%	68%	11%	11%	78%	82%	10%	13%	30%	97%	9%	0%	61%	3%	5.01	4.31	5.31	5.6	5.28	5.25
	Indian	89%	95%	42%	3%	53%	68%	6%	11%	87%	82%	10%	13%	52%	97%	2%	0%	46%	3%	4.9	4.31	5.39	5.6	5.17	5.25
	Japanese	84%	95%	37%	3%	60%	68%	5%	11%	86%	82%	19%	13%	53%	97%	2%	0%	44%	3%	4.23	4.31	4.98	5.6	5.02	5.25
	Native Hawaiian	89%	95%	7%	3%	72%	68%	12%	11%	72%	82%	13%	13%	93%	97%	0%	0%	7%	3%	4.01	4.31	5.58	5.6	5.43	5.25
	Pacific Islander	93%	95%	7%	3%	73%	68%	14%	11%	79%	82%	15%	13%	93%	97%	0%	0%	7%	3%	3.92	4.31	5.46	5.6	5.21	5.25
	Hmong	76%	95%	72%	3%	58%	68%	10%	11%	76%	82%	7%	13%	25%	97%	11%	0%	64%	3%	5.13	4.31	5.27	5.6	5.4	5.25
English Proficiency	Beginner	35%	N/A	97%	N/A	27%	N/A	3%	N/A	81%	N/A	0%	N/A	0%	N/A	84%	N/A	16%	N/A	5.41	N/A	3.65	N/A	4.14	N/A
	Intermediate	68%	100%	74%	0%	60%	100%	6%	0%	76%	100%	9%	0%	21%	100%	19%	0%	60%	0%	5.29	7	5.16	6	4.91	6
	Advanced	87%	98%	53%	8%	59%	42%	14%	15%	85%	92%	9%	0%	41%	98%	4%	0%	55%	2%	4.93	3.98	5.34	5.78	5.24	5.58
	Native	92%	95%	35%	2%	56%	73%	6%	10%	77%	79%	9%	16%	64%	97%	2%	0%	34%	3%	4.53	4.36	5.49	5.56	5.53	5.46
Immigration Status	First Gen	85%	100%	63%	3%	51%	35%	12%	18%	85%	94%	9%	3%	33%	100%	9%	0%	58%	0%	5.2	3.94	5.26	5.94	5.19	5.65
	Second Gen	78%	100%	37%	9%	60%	45%	6%	0%	82%	73%	7%	27%	60%	91%	4%	0%	36%	9%	4.11	3.27	5.28	5.18	5.16	5.27
	Third Gen	88%	92%	34%	2%	73%	61%	6%	20%	63%	84%	7%	18%	60%	94%	4%	0%	36%	6%	4.59	3.59	5.4	5.35	5.5	4.96
	Latter Gen	92%	95%	21%	3%	68%	80%	8%	7%	75%	79%	10%	13%	74%	97%	0%	0%	25%	3%	4.27	4.7	5.64	5.63	5.6	5.62
Political Affiliation	Republican	85%	95%	55%	6%	55%	67%	11%	9%	79%	74%	9%	14%	43%	93%	9%	0%	48%	7%	4.92	4.47	5.24	5.59	5.18	5.44
	Democrat	87%	95%	52%	1%	61%	77%	11%	16%	80%	83%	8%	15%	43%	100%	6%	0%	52%	0%	4.87	4.21	5.36	5.52	5.31	5.37
	Independent	81%	97%	40%	2%	53%	53%	6%	3%	85%	90%	10%	9%	54%	97%	5%	0%	40%	3%	4.69	4.28	5.41	5.74	5.32	5.72
Education	Some HS	100%	100%	0%	0%	50%	100%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%	0%	50%	100%	0%	0%	50%	0%	5	4.57	6.5	5.43	6	6.71
	HS Grad	92%	100%	54%	0%	46%	33%	0%	0%	69%	100%	0%	0%	46%	100%	0%	0%	54%	0%	4.92	4	5.69	5.33	5.85	5.17
	Some College	77%	96%	36%	0%	54%	50%	8%	8%	85%	79%	8%	8%	60%	88%	3%	0%	37%	12%	4.42	3.67	5.43	5.29	5.26	5.08
	Associates	81%	98%	49%	5%	41%	68%	7%	12%	84%	68%	7%	12%	52%	95%	11%	0%	38%	5%	4.69	4.17	5.26	5.63	5.17	5.68
	College Grad	83%	84%	48%	3%	61%	70%	7%	6%	78%	81%	7%	11%	48%	97%	7%	0%	45%	3%	4.81	4.37	5.43	5.62	5.37	5.51
	Some Post-Grad	90%	94%	56%	0%	58%	70%	15%	13%	79%	87%	12%	19%	38%	100%	10%	0%	52%	0%	4.89	4.36	5.19	5.62	5.15	5.57
	Post Grad	87%	95%	55%	5%	62%	73%	13%	16%	82%	84%	10%	16%	39%	98%	4%	0%	57%	2%	5.11	4.55	5.29	5.69	5.27	5.27

AA = Asian American
GP = General Population

0%

50%

100%

Not close at all

Moderately Close

Extremely close

Note: Japanese participants were surveyed as part of the General Population group and not part of the targeted groups. As such, their sample size is not comparable to the other groups.

Appendix II

Summary of Findings

		I regularly encounter...				I believe...				I have shared a political story...				I believe ___ have a responsibility for preventing the spread of false news							
		Inaccurate news		Made-up news		I can recognize made-up news		Made-up news causes confusion		I later identified as false		Knowing it was made-up		Members of the public		Government officials		Social Networking Sites		News Media	
Demographic		AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP	AA	GP
Age	Gen Z	2.3	2.51	2.65	2.91	3.11	3.18	2.98	3.13	37%	30%	23%	22%	4.62	4.66	6.01	5.96	4.79	5.05	5.7	5.84
	Millennial	2.26	2.21	2.55	2.55	3.2	3.12	2.93	2.88	31%	36%	20%	16%	4.7	4.53	6	6.07	4.92	4.8	5.72	5.79
	Gen X	2.36	2.17	2.64	2.5	3.11	3.17	2.5	3	36%	50%	32%	0%	5.11	5	5.86	6.67	4.86	5	5.82	7
Ethnicity	Chinese	2.73	2.77	2.34	2.44	3.26	3.13	3	2.97	29%	34%	14%	18%	4.74	4.59	6.08	6.04	4.79	4.9	5.66	5.84
	Filipino	2.66	2.77	2.44	2.44	3.14	3.13	2.86	2.97	39%	34%	22%	18%	4.75	4.59	6.1	6.04	4.86	4.9	5.76	5.84
	Korean	2.72	2.77	2.35	2.44	3.17	3.13	2.93	2.97	30%	34%	18%	18%	4.64	4.59	5.96	6.04	4.99	4.9	5.73	5.84
	Vietnamese	2.68	2.77	2.41	2.44	3.2	3.13	2.91	2.97	32%	34%	18%	18%	4.73	4.59	6.03	6.04	4.82	4.9	5.62	5.84
	Indian	2.75	2.77	2.53	2.44	3.1	3.13	3.06	2.97	38%	34%	19%	18%	4.64	4.59	6.06	6.04	4.81	4.9	5.7	5.84
	Japanese	2.91	2.77	2.58	2.44	2.98	3.13	3.05	2.97	40%	34%	26%	18%	4.51	4.59	5.95	6.04	4.4	4.9	5.51	5.84
	Native Hawaiian	2.94	2.77	2.43	2.44	3.14	3.13	2.78	2.97	30%	34%	22%	18%	4.85	4.59	5.87	6.04	4.66	4.9	5.83	5.84
	Pacific Islander	3.09	2.77	2.66	2.44	3.01	3.13	2.89	2.97	43%	34%	29%	18%	4.73	4.59	5.71	6.04	4.88	4.9	5.63	5.84
	Hmong	2.5	2.77	2.23	2.44	3.16	3.13	2.98	2.97	31%	34%	32%	18%	4.44	4.59	5.99	6.04	4.97	4.9	5.78	5.84
English Proficiency	Beginner	1.78	N/A	2.57	N/A	2.84	N/A	3.08	N/A	38%	N/A	0%	N/A	4.14	N/A	6.03	N/A	4.46	N/A	4.89	N/A
	Intermediate	1.96	2	2.45	3	2.97	3	2.97	2	43%	100%	32%	100%	4.45	4	6.06	6	4.42	5	5.65	6
	Advanced	2.24	2.35	2.52	2.7	3.15	3.23	2.93	2.63	33%	25%	21%	18%	4.57	4.63	5.91	5.83	4.94	5.38	5.7	5.78
	Native	2.49	2.32	2.76	2.68	3.26	3.13	2.93	3.06	31%	36%	19%	17%	4.94	4.59	6.11	6.09	4.93	4.81	5.8	5.85
Immigration Status	First Gen	2.33	2.56	2.56	2.74	3.14	3.26	2.9	2.5	34%	24%	21%	18%	4.62	4.65	6.06	5.94	4.95	5.71	5.64	5.79
	Second Gen	1.92	1.64	2.5	2.55	3.17	3.27	2.95	3.09	34%	18%	18%	18%	4.74	5.18	5.83	5.91	4.67	5.09	5.74	6
	Third Gen	2.35	2.16	2.71	2.39	3.13	3.06	3.05	2.96	31%	27%	24%	22%	4.7	4.18	5.87	5.8	4.79	5.18	5.86	5.55
	Latter Gen	2.38	2.38	2.76	2.79	3.24	3.13	3.02	3.08	33%	40%	21%	16%	4.82	4.68	6.04	6.16	4.71	4.62	5.86	5.93
Political Affiliation	Republican	2.21	2.23	2.56	2.65	3.13	3.17	2.98	3.01	35%	42%	22%	17%	4.72	4.64	6.03	5.99	4.86	4.86	5.65	5.85
	Democrat	2.31	2.38	2.64	2.64	3.16	3.09	2.99	3.13	32%	26%	20%	17%	4.65	4.53	6	5.98	4.92	5	5.77	5.76
	Independent	2.33	2.34	2.56	2.83	3.19	3.19	2.78	2.65	34%	38%	23%	19%	4.65	4.64	5.96	6.24	4.75	4.78	5.66	5.97
Education	Some HS	3.5	3.86	3.5	3.86	4	3.71	3.5	4	0%	14%	0%	0%	5	5.14	7	6.71	4	4.86	5.5	6.43
	HS Grad	2.54	2.33	3	2.83	3.38	3.5	3.15	3.17	38%	33%	8%	17%	5.15	4.83	5.69	6.5	4.62	4.17	5.85	5.5
	Some College	2.26	1.92	2.6	2.71	3.19	3.04	2.76	2.74	34%	38%	25%	25%	4.87	4.38	5.97	6.08	4.7	5.04	5.92	5.5
	Associates	2.22	2.51	2.58	3	3.12	3	2.86	2.63	37%	37%	25%	20%	4.76	4.98	6	6.1	4.71	4.95	5.53	6
	College Grad	2.26	2.46	2.67	2.92	3.15	3.19	2.92	3.03	32%	27%	21%	16%	4.72	4.7	5.92	5.9	4.78	4.75	5.78	5.87
	Some Post-Grad	2.25	2.17	2.52	2.28	3.09	3.23	3.02	3.09	30%	38%	19%	15%	4.49	4.49	6.03	6.11	5.08	5.06	5.66	5.83
	Post Grad	2.35	2.16	2.54	2.4	3.22	3.05	3.01	3.03	37%	37%	20%	19%	4.62	4.31	6.1	5.97	4.95	4.94	5.68	5.79
AA = Asian American GP = General Population																					

Note: Japanese participants were surveyed as part of the General Population group and not part of the targeted groups. As such, their sample size is not comparable to the other groups.

Appendix III: Sample Survey Questions

We sourced most survey questions from past studies related to misinformation as well as Asian American attitudes and behaviors, including:

- This 2016 [Pew Research study on “fake news” and misinformation in the U.S.](#)
- Pew Research’s 2020 [American News Pathway survey](#)

We also did background research by consulting [AAPI Data survey resources](#) and the Pew Research (2023) [“Being Asian in America” survey](#).



Sample survey questions include:

From 1 being "not at all important" to 7 being "extremely important" ... Which news topics are important to you? (Weather, crime, traffic, etc.)

From 1 being "not closely at all" to 7 being "extremely closely"... How closely do you follow... (international news, national news, local news)

Sample survey questions (cont):

Do you REGULARLY get news or news headlines from any of the following media, websites or apps? (By news, we mean information about events, issues, and politics that involve more than just your friends or family.)

- U.S.-based print news or digital newspaper (e.g., *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, CNN, etc.)
- Asian print or digital media website (*World Journal*, *Nikkei.com*, *The Juggernaut*, *Korea Daily*, *Viet Bao Daily*, etc.)
- Television
- Radio
- Online / social media sources *[if yes, please specify...]*
 - * Reddit
 - * Twitter
 - * Facebook
 - * YouTube
 - * TikTok
 - * LinkedIn
 - * Instagram
 - * Snapchat
 - * Parler
 - * Truth Social
- Messaging *[if yes, please specify...]*
 - * WhatsApp
 - * WeChat
 - * Line
 - * Kakao Talk
 - * Vibr
 - * Signal
 - * Other (please specify): _____
 - * Do not access news regularly

Would you say you get most of your news from English-language sources, from non-English sources, or from both?

With 1 being "no responsibility" and 7 being "a great deal of responsibility"... To what degree do you think the following actors should play a role in preventing the spread of inaccurate information? (members of the public, government officials, technology companies, news media professionals)

With 1 being "not at all confident," 2 being "not very confident," 3 being "somewhat confident," and 4 being "very confident"... How confident are you in your own ability to recognize news that is completely made-up?

Appendix IV: Statistical Test Results

Theme 1: News Media Diet

Table 1: Test of proportions for news sources between Asian American and General Population respondents

	P_{AA}	P_{GP}	Z-Statistic	p-value
U.S. News	0.85	0.95	-4.38	0.00***
Asian News	0.50	0.03	14.16	0.00***
Television	0.57	0.68	-3.33	0.00***
Radio	0.10	0.11	-0.44	0.66
Social Media	0.81	0.82	-0.31	0.76
Messaging	0.09	0.13	-2.24	0.03*

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2: Test of proportions for news source language between Asian American and General Population respondents

	P_{AA}	P_{GP}	Z-Statistic	p-value
English Only	0.45	0.97	-15.19	0.00***
Non-English Only	0.07	0.00	4.23	0.00***
Mix of Both	0.48	0.03	13.36	0.00***

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: t-tests of news locality between Asian American and General Population respondents

	M_{AA}	M_{GP}	SD_{AA}	SD_{GP}	t-statistic	p-value
International	4.85	4.31	1.31	1.40	5.76	0.00***
National	5.33	5.60	0.97	0.86	-4.49	0.00***
Local	5.27	5.48	1.05	1.04	-2.87	0.00***

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Theme 2: Experiences with Problematic Online Content

Table 4: t-tests of experiences with problematic online content between Asian American and General Population respondents

	M_{AA}	M_{GP}	SD_{AA}	SD_{GP}	t-statistic	p-value
Encountered inaccurate news	2.72	2.68	0.81	0.91	0.71	0.48
Encountered made-up news	2.40	2.31	0.76	0.81	1.71	0.09
Ability to recognize made-up news	3.16	3.14	0.74	0.66	0.38	0.70
Belief made-up news causes confusion	2.94	2.98	0.82	0.83	-0.67	0.503

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Theme 3: Combatting the Spread of Problematic Online Content

Table 5: Test of proportions for personal roles in spreading problematic online content between Asian American and General Population respondents

	P_{AA}	P_{GP}	Z-Statistic	p-value
Shared political story later identified as fabricated	0.34	0.34	-0.10	0.92
Shared political story knowing it was made-up	0.21	0.18	1.31	0.19

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$

Table 6: t-tests for belief in stakeholders' role in preventing the spread of problematic online content between Asian American and General Population respondents

	M_{AA}	M_{GP}	SD_{AA}	SD_{GP}	t-statistic	p-value
Members of the Public	4.67	4.59	1.05	0.99	1.18	0.24
Government Officials	6.00	6.04	1.12	1.17	-0.54	0.59
Technology Companies	4.86	4.90	1.21	1.14	-0.54	0.59
News Media	5.71	5.84	0.98	0.95	-1.95	0.05*

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.001$



ASIAN AMERICANS
**ADVANCING
JUSTICE**
AAJC